The Right can consolidate power depending on how Denktash acts. Denktash lured Ali Erel and others into criticising the Annan plan. Furthermore, he takes credit for things that may seem on the surface against Turkish Cypriot interests, including the announcement by Turkey that it intends to pay the Loizidou verdict. He is, in tandem with Turkey, making diplomatic gestures implying progress toward a settlement. In establishing property commissions, designed to provide compensation to dispossessed Greek Cypriots, Denktash is trying to demonstrate that alternatives to the Annan plan can be realized on the property issue. It is significant to note that some Greek Cypriots are actually inclined to take up the offer of compensation, an issue that will serve to divide Greek Cypriots.

However, it remains to be seen what kind of pressures the Turkish government will face to begin negotiations based on Annan prior to December. Of course, Turkey is not always receptive to outside pressures, but it does affect diplomacy. Turkey, since the Helsinki summit, has been committed to supporting the UN Secretary General’s good offices mission. It is unclear as to whether Turkey is supportive of efforts to solve the ‘Cyprus problem’, but opposed to the Annan plan itself. The Adalet ve Kalkınma (Justice and Development) or AK party government seems to push an ambiguous line here. On the one hand, the government is wholly supportive of EU membership and eager to push through a bevy of domestic reforms to fully democratize Turkey and lessen the oversight function of the military in political life. On the other hand, we see the government moving forward with a customs union framework with north Cyprus, something that is strikingly at odds with the overt EU orientation. These contradictions reveal that Turkish foreign policy is internally contested and the ultimate direction is undetermined.

It is also important to recognise that Turkey is opaque, but not a monolith. Some Turks refer to a ‘deep state’ that makes all strategic decisions, but the very fact that this schism over how to proceed with the EU is in the news reveals that there is a slow but incremental process of change. As Turkey moves forward with its reforms it will push for reassurances from the EU that it will actually get an accession talks date soon. Until that date is granted – and institutionally that is not possible before December 2004 – the ‘status quo’ will remain in force over Cyprus unless there is a change in government in the north and hence a mandate in favour of the Annan plan. Therefore, it is likely that Denktash will get support from Ankara to preempt such an eventuality. Unfortunately, this means that Cyprus and Turkey’s own reform process are conflated, further complicating diplomacy.

It may also be added that Denktash’s relationship with Ankara is not at all clear. Some claim that Denktash is merely an agent of Turkey’s bidding, while others attribute much more to his ability to influence, if not shape policy. It might be too strong to say that it is a case of the ‘tail wagging the dog’, but it is also not very conceivable that Ankara would pursue radically new policies that conflicted with Denktash’s views. Only those privy to the inner workings of the Turkish foreign policy decision making could tell who is calling the shots in the recent series of ostensible confidence-building measures unilaterally announced by the Turkish side. One of Denktash’ great strengths has been his ability to smooth over differences with Turkey, with notable exceptions. Denktash’ differences with the late Turgut Özal have been well publicised, as has his recent spat with Erdoğan. Even so, Erdoğan’s pronouncements on Cyprus are very reminiscent of Denktash. He refers to a ‘two-state solution’ based on ‘sovereign’ equals. The debate between them, therefore, is whether the Annan plan in its current form or following negotiations could meet those criteria.

Turkish diplomats do understand the significance of the signing of the Accession Treaty between the EU and Cyprus, as well as of the fact that, as of May 2004, the Greek Cypriot-led Republic of Cyprus will represent the entire island in the EU, with all that this implies for Turkey’s own aspirations to join. How the opening of the gates for crossings and other measures factor into the push for a comprehensive settlement – outside of the parameters of the Annan plan - is not openly articulated. Are the measures part of a grand strategy to undermine the Annan plan and replace it with a new comprehensive framework, or are they merely piecemeal tactical moves designed to lessen Turkey’s diplomatic burdens in the short run?

The crossings do have a domestic impact though, allowing the system to release some pressure, permitting Turkish Cypriots to explore the south and take advantage of individual rights under the Republic of Cyprus constitution. Turkish Cypriots seem to have mixed feelings about what they have found in the south. Much is made by Greek Cypriots of the dispelling of myths, assuming that the crossings prove that a multicultural coexistence is possible. It is not that simple. Some Turkish Cypriots have decided that they prefer their enclaves, for better or worse, and only want Greek Cypriots as ‘tourists.’ Is the south the land of milk and honey for them or is it a place where Turkish Cypriots will be treated as second class citizens? Some are seeking passports and employment, and others pointing to the supposed duplicity of the current Papadopolous government in implementing trade policies with Turkish Cypriots. Ironically, given the recent spat between various Greek Cypriots and Talat – regarding how he likened Papadopolous to Denktash as an agent of the ‘status quo’ – as well as similar acrimony between Greek Cypriots and Ali Erel over trade, Turkish Cypriots appear more united than divided. This partly reflects sincere frustration, but may also be in part political posturing for domestic consumption.

Passports have proven a chimera. Whereas some Turkish Cypriots hoped to take advantage of Republic of Cyprus travel documents, they have found that the authorities in Turkey are complicit with those in north Cyprus to prevent this from being realised. Turkish Cypriots attempting to exit from a port in Turkey are asked to produce visas or passports for entry into third countries. Travellers producing Republic of Cyprus passports are forbidden exit. Legal issues aside, this issue, among others, provide political ammunition to the opposition, who claim that Turkish Cypriots face humiliating discrimination.

Turkish Cypriots are also divided over whether they want to be repatriated to their old towns and villages, or whether they prefer the relative security – and in some cases new found wealth – of the north. The property issue looms large in this regard with ‘status quo’ forces appealing to those who stand to lose under the Annan plan provisions. Ultimately, the crossings have had an ambiguous impact on domestic politics, confirming prior convictions in some cases, converting others, and confusing some.

Denktash has also shown that he can take initiative on the heels of the signing of the Accession Treaty in April. He is trying to put to rest the notion that there are no alternatives to the Annan plan and that its preset dates of implementation were set in stone. Some of this is based on conviction, no doubt, that anything is possible in diplomacy, but much is also just drawing attention away from the relatively weaker hand dealt the Turkish side following EU accession without a solution.

What would happen in the event of a victory for supporters of the Annan plan? There are skeptics who claim that Turkish intervention in the ultimate outcome is inevitable. The 1990 elections and the subsequent fallout with the opposition boycotting parliament for a couple of years is held up as a blueprint for the upcoming elections. In 1990, the opposition ran on a unified ticket against the UBP, but failed to secure 50%, and the result was a landslide victory for the government.The opposition alleges that Turkey pumped in money to help seal victory for the ‘status quo’ forces. Ironically, it would appear that it is the CTP itself, one of the ostensible ‘victims’ of intervention, that aims to court Ankara. In championing the rights of settlers within the Annan framework, and providing the AK party government with a pro-EU alternative to the UBP government, CTP seems to be hoping for at least neutrality from Ankara.

What would the relationship between an incoming government and Ankara be like? It would depend largely on the margin of victory. Even if the CTP, for instance, secured the greatest number of votes and unavoidably became a partner in coalition government, it is likely that Ankara would move quickly to co-opt it into its foreign policy with modifications. It is unlikely that Talat would make radical demands. It would, however, make it easier for Ankara to push for a settlement along the Annan line and gain international diplomatic support in the Cyprus problem.

These are trying times for Turkish diplomacy. Uncertainty regarding the international environment, particularly in Turkey’s relationship with its long time ally the United States over Iraq, together with conflicting views on how far to go with reforms to satisfy EU membership criteria, has created conflict within the country. Cyprus tends to be an emotive issue for many Turks, and any government would be loath to appear weak on Cyprus without delivering something concrete like EU accession. The process of reform in Turkey has political ramifications. Some fear the reforms will be the undoing of the republic established by Atatürk either in terms of territorial integrity (i.e. Kurdish separatism) or the demise of secularism (i.e. the rise of Islamism), or both. Therefore, although all mainstream politicians are obliged to favour EU membership (a ‘state policy’ or strategic orientation) there are significant differences in the degree to which various parties and interests are committed to it. Inevitably, Cyprus is part of the equation, as it is increasingly clear that EU membership goes through it. But there is significant opposition among some Turkish elites from all fields: politicians, academicians, bureaucrats, media pundits, and, of course, the military. Conservative elements in Turkey are allied with the Turkish Cypriot ‘status quo’ in their Euro-skeptic stance. Opposition to the EU, though, is indirect, and Cyprus seems to be the first line of defence. The argument, echoing the official line, is that the accession of Cyprus prior to Turkey is a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee, and that a political settlement on Cyprus cannot be put forth as a precondition for Turkey’s own accession as it is not part of the Copenhagen criteria. Thus, Turkish diplomacy on Cyprus is also affected by the domestic debate on reform and the EU.